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GENERAL

1. Ambassador Bohlen reports on talk with Malenkov:

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Ambassador Bohlen reports that Premier Malenkov, during a half-hour conversation at the 7 November reception, seemed particularly desirous of impressing upon him the seriousness with which the Soviet Union viewed the world situation and the intensity of its desire to prevent war. The ambassador believes the attitude of Malenkov and other Soviet officials at the reception and the restrained tone of the holiday speeches indicate hesitancy and concern on the part of the Soviet government arising out of the current situation--particularly the progress toward West German rearmament--which it can do little about.

Malenkov told Bohlen and the British ambassador that Moscow was not trying to improve its relations with Britain at the expense of the United States; the USSR was not so foolish as to try such a stupid game. He said the Soviet Union wanted normal and good relations with all countries. With regard to the Paris agreements, Malenkov said that something should be done to improve relations "before their ratification." He counseled that many outstanding problems would take time and patience to settle and warned against letting small issues develop into big ones.

Bohlen believes Malenkov's talk and reference to "small issues" was directly motivated by his knowledge of the recent plane incident and reflected concern that the cumulative effect of such incidents with the United States might lead to serious consequences.

2. Bulganin makes friendly overtures to Iranian and Turkish military attachés:

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According to the Iranian embassy in Moscow, Soviet defense minister Bulganin told the Iranian military attaché

at the 7 November reception that Stalin had "spoiled the USSR's good relations with Iran" and that he, Bulganin, had been against this policy. Bulganin added that "we are now returning to Lenin's policy" of friendship with Iran. He asked the attaché to report this to Tehran as the view of the Soviet government. Bulganin then turned to the Turkish military attaché and made a similarly friendly statement. He also told the Iranian attaché that the USSR would welcome military missions at any time and that they would be shown "everything."

Ambassador Bohlen comments that this is the first time since Stalin's death that a top Soviet official is reported to have spoken directly in opposition to Stalin policy.

Comment: Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to negotiate differences with Iran and, while its efforts to keep Iran from siding with the West have been largely unsuccessful, it may still believe that friendliness will preclude an all-out commitment. Soviet propaganda aimed at both Turkey and Yugoslavia has been particularly friendly during recent weeks, probably to counter Western defense efforts in the Balkans and the Near East.

SOUTHEAST ASIA


3. Mendes-France wants Washington talks to center on Indochina:

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French premier Mendes-France considers Indochina the most important topic for discussion during his visit to Washington next week, according to Jean Soutou, his personal spokesman.


Soutou told American officials in Paris on 9 November that the premier intends to take up the question of American aid along the line: "Are the Atlantic allies prepared to make a further major effort to save the rest of Indochina from Communism? If so, how? If not, how can we best get out of Indochina?"



Comment: Minister for the Associated States La Chambre has made it clear that France still expects to control administration of American aid to Indochina, and there are other indications that France hopes the United States will accept changes in the positions agreed on in the French-American discussions in Washington in September.

France apparently still hopes to do business with the Viet Minh. The official French radio has announced that Jean Sainteny, French representative to the Viet Minh, will soon be officially accredited as a delegate general. While he was given this title in August, Mendes-France later told American officials that it had been a mistake and that his functions were purely consular. A French official in Washington admitted on 6 November that France would have difficulty refusing the Viet Minh a similar mission in Paris.

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5. Sukarno's endorsement of government's position seen as turning point in Indonesian politics:

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In a public address in central Sumatra on 9 November, President Sukarno stated that anyone loyal to ideas of social progress in Indonesia would be

firmly against either Western or domestic capitalism. He accused "several Indonesian leaders" of collaborating with foreign disruptive elements to bring down the cabinet. He said that the Indonesian economy must not continue under external control, and deplored the fact that "intelligent Indonesians" are still under the influence of foreign ideas.

The American embassy comments that if correctly reported, the speech is a clear abandonment of Sukarno's nonparty position and an unequivocal endorsement of the present government coalition and the National Party. As such it is a turning point in Indonesia's internal political struggle.

Comment: Sukarno's speech climaxes several months of activity in which he has increasingly identified his own political future with that of the National Party, which dominates the present cabinet. Formerly he had been regarded as above politics and the most important controlling and unifying factor in the Indonesian political picture.

As a partisan politician Sukarno will be far more vulnerable to attack by the government's opposition. His prestige, however, is still such as to provide the government with much greater staying power than it has recently exhibited. The government has become increasingly dependent on the Communists for parliamentary support.



SOUTH ASIA

6. Nehru seen now "cautiously sympathetic" toward United States:

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[REDACTED] Leading Indian editors and publishers in Madras, all of whom have pipelines into New Delhi, are convinced that Nehru has returned from Communist China disillusioned with what he saw, according to the American consul general in Madras. Nehru will not admit disillusionment, and dramatic moves on his part should not be anticipated. Nevertheless, Nehru will be more "cautiously sympathetic" to American policies.

Comment: There is ample evidence that Nehru did not fall under Communist influence in Peiping and that he recognizes India's need to advance rapidly in the economic sphere to keep pace with China.

One of the most striking illustrations of this is Nehru's apparent willingness to surrender the leadership of the Congress Party to its conservative elements, whose views have been more in harmony with the West than his own.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

7. Communists reported to be planning world-wide protest against Iranian executions:

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[REDACTED] The Iranian government has information which indicates that the Soviet Union is planning a world-wide propaganda campaign blaming the United States for the current executions of Communists in Iran, according to Foreign Minister Entezam.

Entezam told American chargé Rountree that Iran is considering what measures it can take to counter local rumors that the United States ordered the executions.

Comment: Soviet broadcasts to Iran and to Europe soon after the arrests of Iranian Communist officers

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established the line that the anti-Communist campaign was American-instigated. The only demonstrations against the executions thus far reported occurred on 1 November, when a small group of Israeli Communists protested outside the American embassy in Tel Aviv.

A Tehran rumor, perhaps spread by the Communists, asserts that the Shah attributes the executions to American pressure.

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WESTERN EUROPE

9. High West German official discusses Saar agreement developments:

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The West German government is launching a large-scale domestic propaganda campaign this week to emphasize the advantages of the Saar agreement, State Secretary Globke told Ambassador Conant on 8 November. Chancellor Adenauer, he said, intends to negotiate with the French on the agreement, particularly on its economic provisions, but is unlikely to push hard on questions of principle.

Globke believes the Refugee Party will support the Saar agreement after the 28 November state elections, and that the Free Democrats will split on the issue.

American observers in Bonn believe the election results in Hesse and Bavaria will considerably influence the Bundestag votes--now tentatively scheduled for mid-December--on the Saar agreement and the Paris treaties.

Globke said that the possibility of a Constitutional Court case on the Saar accord could not be excluded, but that he hoped the Hesse elections would dissolve the only state government that might bring suit.

Comment: It now appears that the minor coalition parties would accept the Saar agreement if assured that it will be provisional and that political activity within the Saar will be unhampered. It is doubtful, however, whether the French are willing to commit themselves to the interpretations desired by the Germans.

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